Question

Research terrorist incidences in a country of your choiceWhat is their history of terrorism?

  1. What is their history of counterterrorism?
  2. What are their most significant challenges in combatting terrorism?

Answer & Explanation
Verified Solved by verified expert

Part1. History of terrorism in Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda

 

   Osama bin Laden created al-Qaeda, Arabic al-Qidah ("the Base"), a broad-based militant Islamist organization in the late 1980s.

During the Afghan War, Al-Qaeda originated as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting the Soviet Union; members were recruited from all across the Islamic world. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the organization disbanded, but its leaders continued to oppose what they saw as corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., American) involvement in Islamic lands. The gang was based in Sudan for a while in the early 1990s before relocating to Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.
Al-Qaeda joined with numerous other violent Islamist groups, including Egypt's Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and its leaders proclaimed holy war on the United States on several occasions. The organization set up camps for Muslim militants from all over the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents were involved in a number of terrorist attacks, including the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, and a suicide bomb attack on the US warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). The September 11 attacks on the United States were carried out by 19 al-Qaeda-affiliated militants in 2001. The US administration retaliated within weeks by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or seized, including some prominent members (including the militant accused of planning and organizing the September 11 attacks), and the others, along with their commanders, were pushed into hiding.


The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 put the country's viability as an al-Qaeda safe haven and training ground in jeopardy, jeopardizing communication, operational, and financial ties between al-leadership Qaeda's and militants. These realities, rather than greatly hurting al-Qaeda, drove a structural evolution and the emergence of "franchising." Attacks were increasingly orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (located in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions following the US invasion of Afghanistan), but also by the locally, somewhat independent groups it promoted. Such grassroots autonomous groups, which consolidated locally around a shared agenda while adhering to the al-Qaeda name and doctrine, resulted in a dispersed kind of militancy that was far more difficult to combat.
Al-Qaeda was linked to more assaults in the six years after September 11 than it had been in the six years before, including strikes in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria, and elsewhere, thanks to this organizational transformation. At the same time, al-Qaeda began to use the Internet as a broad platform for recruiting and communication, as well as a platform for video messages, broadcasts, and propaganda. Meanwhile, some analysts expressed worry that the US policy, which focused mostly on military defeating al-Qaeda, was ineffective, and al-Qaeda was deemed to have reached its peak strength since the September 2001 attacks toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

 

Bin Laden was killed by US military operations on May 2, 2011, after US intelligence discovered him in a fortified facility in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 kilometers) from Islamabad. The operation was carried out by a small squad that arrived by helicopter at the Abbottabad complex. U.S. President Barack Obama declared bin Laden's killing after it was confirmed, hailing the operation as a huge accomplishment in the fight against al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda issued a statement on June 16, 2011, declaring that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's long-serving deputy, had been picked to succeed him as the organization's head.

 

Part 2. history of counterterrorism?

 

Successful ways to tackle terrorism that is created by major, deep-rooted problems in the past have included crushing the current threat first, and then making adjustments to make terrorism's reemergence less likely. While terrorism deterrence may appear to be an unattainable aim at first look — notions like co-optation and inducement cannot be expected to work against terrorists with the unwavering dedication of an Osama bin Laden - it may be possible to influence some members of terrorist organisations. These aren't just one-dimensional entities; they're complex systems with a variety of components, many of which can be influenced. To ensure the long-term viability of its counterterrorism efforts, the US must devise a multifaceted strategy that includes attempting to influence those elements of terrorist systems that are potentially deterrable, such as state supporters or wealthy financiers living the high life while supporting terrorists in the shadows. The US strategy should include not only military attacks, but also political warfare, putting terrorists' most prized possessions in jeopardy, a credible threat of force against any state or group that supports the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes, and maintaining cooperation with other countries fighting terrorism. At the same time, the plan must uphold key American ideals, such as the use of force with discrimination and the application of due process in the delivery of swift justice.
Long before that fateful September morning 10 years ago, the United Nations was preoccupied with the issue of terrorism. For decades, the Organization has brought the international community together to condemn terrorist crimes and to build an international legal framework that allows governments to cooperatively combat the threat. At the United Nations and associated forums, sixteen international treaties have been negotiated on topics as diverse as plane hijackings, hostage takings, terrorism financing, explosives marking, and the threat of nuclear terrorism.

In addition, in 1999, the Security Council voted to impose sanctions on the Taliban and, later, Al-Qaeda, in reaction to deadly assaults in East Africa and the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. A travel restriction, asset freeze, and arms embargo have been imposed on persons and entities linked with these organizations, according to the Council.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Nations Security Council took even more bold action, recognizing that terrorism would continue to constitute a severe danger to international peace and security in the new millennium. It passed a comprehensive resolution outlining the next steps in the battle against terrorism. That resolution calls on all UN Member States, individually and collectively, to deny terrorists safe harbor and financial support, as well as to work together to bring them to justice.

Following that, Security Council resolutions focused more on adopting preventive steps, emphasizing that extremists were using the Internet to recruit people and instigate terrorist attacks, for example. The Council began to emphasize the need of anti-terrorist measures being consistent with states' international legal commitments, especially human rights law. It also believed it was critical to ensure that non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, did not have access to WMDs. Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly enacted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, emphasizing the significance of addressing issues that can lead to terrorism. Unresolved conflicts, victim dehumanization, discrimination, human rights breaches, and a lack of good governance are among them.

 

Part3. 

1.Terrorist Threats from Within and Outside the United States.

First, the blurring of the lines between domestic and international terrorism will have an impact on the current divisions between foreign and domestic intelligence, as well as intelligence and law enforcement, and how the government responds to such overlapping threats. Any practical distinction between domestic and international terrorism has almost totally vanished in an increasingly networked world connected by social and digital media.

Today's international jihadist groups, for example, rely heavily on local, lone actors to carry out their actions. In May 2016, Islamic State spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani urged Western adherents to attack in their own countries rather than fighting in Syria and Iraq. "Even the tiniest action you take in their heartland is better and more lasting for us than if you were among us," he asserted. "We wish we were in your place to punish the Crusaders day and night if one of you aspired to reach the Islamic State." Thousands of miles distant, his call to arms was answered by followers, resulting in fatal carnage in the United States and some of its European allies. In the United States, the bloodiest Islamic State-inspired incident, which took place in Orlando, Florida in June 2016, was carried out by an individual who was a native New Yorker living in Florida.

2. The Livestream and the Age of the Manifesto

Violent far-right and far-left extremists, as well as so-called violent incels, are now copying the Islamic State's astonishing success in speaking to a worldwide audience via social media and digital technologies. Brian Jenkins famously referred to terrorism as "theatre" in 1974. It has evolved into a purposefully murderous type of performance art in which individuals create, choreograph, and broadcast their violence in real time to worldwide audiences via social media, completely circumventing the reliance on traditional media in the past. As a result, we are currently living in a manifesto and broadcast era.

Inspire by Anders Breivik's twin attacks in 2011 on the Norwegian prime minister's office in Oslo and a youth camp on the island of Utya to publicize his 1,500-page manifesto, Tarrant, for example, used modern communications tools both before and during his own twin attacks in New Zealand. He announced the impending violence on Twitter, on the anonymous imageboard 8chan, and on both platforms, with links to his 74-page manifesto, dubbed "The Great Replacement." Tarrant apparently wore a camera on his helmet and used it to livestream the shootings on these websites, as well as posting additional links to the material online, along with instructions on how to access it. At least three other white nationalist gunmen have attempted to webcast their attacks on places of worship after the Christchurch attacks.

3. Changing Terrorist Strategies

Intelligence and law enforcement resources will likely be stretched to their limits as they try to identify and prevent unsophisticated, crude terrorist acts that require little planning and do not rely on terrorism's traditional arsenal. On the other hand, the deliberate efforts of a variety of opponents to circumvent existing laws and prohibitions on weapons through 3D-printing technology and "ghost guns" will continue to pose new obstacles.

Terrorists use a variety of weapons, both simple and inventive, to carry out operations that minimize planning and logistical preparation in some circumstances and effectively render national gun laws and prohibitions meaningless in others. The above-mentioned stabbing, mass shooting, and vehicular attacks are clearly less sophisticated, and their perpetrators are clearly less capable than their more professional, trained counterparts, such as the multiple Islamic State teams that carried out the Paris November 2015 and Brussels March 2016 attacks, largely using sophisticated suicide vests. They can, however, be just as homicidal. The truck that plowed into a crowd of Bastille Day revelers in Nice in July 2016, killing 86 people, is a prime example. Although Minassian's automobile rampage in Toronto resulted in a significantly lesser death toll, it was no less devastating and demonstrated the murderous potential of ramming strikes against classic soft targets.

4. Military and Violent Extremism.

The involvement of military personnel in acts of mass violence in the United States, Canada, and Europe is also a source of worry. Between 2000 and 2013, over a quarter of all adult active shooters in the United States had some military experience, according to the FBI. Between 1972 and 2015, 37 percent of 52 "lone offender" terrorists in the United States were veterans or active duty military personnel, according to the bureau. Both percentages are much greater than the 7.3 percent of living Americans who have served in the military.

The rise in the number of people in Western countries who have served in the military and have knowledge of weapons and tactics has the potential to dramatically improve the capabilities of violent, extreme movements. During the 1980s, the American white supremacist movement expanded, thanks in part to the competence in fighting and training offered by veterans of the Indochina conflicts. At the time, some of the movement's most prominent figures included Louis Beam, Bo Gritz, Randy Weaver, and Glenn Miller, all of whom were Vietnam War veterans, some with special operations training and talents. A decade later, a US Army veteran of the First Gulf War carried out America's most devastating modern domestic terrorism attack, the 1995 bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma City. In April of that year, Glenn Miller murdered three people at a Jewish community center in Kansas.

5. Terrorist Ideology Convergence and Obfuscation

In terrorist attacks, ideological crossovers have also been a recurring issue. Individual terrorists are increasingly mixing and matching beliefs to justify and explain their animus' targets and provide a larger context for their atrocities. Some far-right extremists, for example, have tried to form an alliance with Islamist radicals in order to preach their own brand of jihad, as seen by their shared admiration of Osama bin Laden. This development has been dubbed "ideological convergence" by the FBI, and "fringe fluidity" by terrorism specialists Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman.

 

Step-by-step explanation

https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/securing-our-future-decade-counter-terrorism-strategies

https://www.lawfareblog.com/challenges-effective-counterterrorism-intelligence-2020s

https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda