Let us suppose (Glaucon continues) that each of two men possesses a magic ring that enables each man to become invisible. One of these men is a just man; the other is unjust. The men's invisibility-at-will enables them to do whatever they want, take whatever they want, seize any opportunity at will. And given the opportunity, both men would seize it and exploit it; the unjust man will behave unjustly; the just man, given the opportunity, will also behave unjustly unless he is a simpleton. Furthermore, Socrates has argued that justice is a virtue, that it is better in and of itself than injustice, no matter the circumstances. No, says Glaucon, it is more rewarding for the unjust man, reaping the benefits of injustice, to appear to be just, thereby incurring honors and reputation consequent upon the appearance of justice.
Moreover, Adeimantus chimes in with his brother, in attempting to fix a definition of justice, we have been talking about the ideal. In mundane reality, when fathers and teachers advise sons and students to strive for justice, they are actually advising the appearance of justice. So Glaucon is correct, and Thrasymachus, in spite of his specious rhetoric, is probably correct. And even if we are reminded that we are taught that the gods themselves reward justice and punish injustice, we know from the stories the poets tell us that the gods can be bribed. Perhaps we can fool the gods with appearance as well as the most of mankind. So in order for Socrates to demonstrate that justice is finally good in and of itself, and injustice commensurately bad, we need a furtherance of that argument.
