In this concluding section of the Enquiry, Hume attempts a further justification of the theory of morals which has been presented in the earlier sections of the book. He begins by calling attention to the fact that what he has said concerning the origin and existence of moral sentiments appears to be so obvious that it is strange indeed that anyone should have felt it necessary to elaborate any argument in defense of it. It would seem that common sense alone would be sufficient to make it clear to any fair-minded person that the principles of morality are all based on the approval of that which is pleasant and useful either to ourselves or to others and the disapproval of that which is contrary to these ends. In fact, we are told that this is sufficient for the great masses of ordinary folk, and had it not been for the confusion and lack of clear understanding on the part of certain learned philosophers and theologians, there would have been no occasion for writing this treatise on morals.
However, confusion on the part of those who profess to be experts in the field leads to doubts and uncertainties among their followers, and it seems to be quite in order to attempt a clarification of the issues involved. So long as people judge matters of this kind by their natural and unprejudiced reason, they will be able to see morality in the light in which he has presented it. It is only when their minds have been corrupted by superstition and false religious notions that they are led astray. Under influences of this kind, they have set forth conceptions of the nature of morality that are not only ill-founded but in many instances have led to practices which are detrimental to human welfare.
Hume is especially critical of a long list of practices which have been fostered in the name of morality but which in his judgment ought to be regarded as vices rather than virtues. The list includes such items as celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification of the flesh, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and what he calls "the whole train of monkish virtues." Obviously, he does not mean that any participation in these practices should be forbidden under any and all circumstances. Rather, he means that these practices in the sense in which they have been regarded as virtues by certain theologians and other leaders of the Church should be rejected.
