Commentary
The appendices which were added to the main portion of the Enquiry were intended to clarify some of the issues involved in the author's moral philosophy and possibly to answer some of the objections which might be raised concerning it. The inclusion of these appendixes is especially valuable for students who have experienced some difficulty in trying to understand what Hume has been saying about morals. In these additions to the original text, he has endeavored to deal directly with some of the major issues raised by his critics. In this way, he hoped to remove some of the ambiguities which might lead to misinterpretations of his doctrines.
The purpose of the first appendix was to clarify his stand with reference to the place and function of reason in matters pertaining to morals. Because Hume had emphasized the role of the feelings in the development of moral beliefs more than had been done by any of his predecessors, it was only natural that some of his critics would think that he had given too large a place to the feelings and had neglected to give proper credit to the reasoning faculty. To eliminate any misunderstanding on this point, he now states very clearly just what it is that he believes reason can do and what it is that it cannot do toward the development of moral beliefs.
Reason, according to Hume, is competent in those areas which have to do with matters of fact, and it is likewise capable of determining the relations that exist between things. Hence, in the field of morals, reason is an adequate tool for finding out what is useful for the particular ends which one has in mind. If you want to achieve health, acquire money, or go certain places, the use of your reasoning powers can tell you how these things may be accomplished. But reason cannot tell you whether these ends are good ends, nor does it have any power to tell you what it is that you ought to do. Reason can tell you what type of consequences are likely to follow certain courses of action, but it cannot tell you whether these consequences are good or bad. Any judgment that you make along these lines will be directed by the feelings rather than the reason. This does not mean that reason has nothing to do with the making of moral judgments, but rather that its true function is to determine means rather than ends.
The second appendix is intended to clarify the meaning of the term self-love. Does this term connote only those actions which are selfish in the narrower sense of the word, or is it possible that it includes actions which are usually called altruistic? The question arises from the fact that moral sentiments are said to have their origin in the feelings. Whose feelings are referred to in this connection? Is it the person who makes the judgment or the persons whose welfare may be affected by it? Since the feelings are necessarily private and no one would voluntarily act for the sake of the welfare of other persons unless the idea was pleasant and agreeable to himself, it would appear that what one does for others is really done for the sake of his own pleasure.
This conclusion, however, does not follow from the facts. It is quite possible that one's objective may be the welfare of others, and any pleasure which he may or may not receive from it is merely incidental to the action itself. An act that is performed for the sake of others can be called a selfish act only by defining selfishness so broadly that it would be logically impossible to have an exception to it. In this case, the term would become meaningless since it would be equivalent to saying that one does what he does. For self-love, or selfishness, to be a meaningful term, it must be defined in a way that is exclusive of some actions. In other words, it must be possible to distinguish between those actions which are exclusive of the welfare of others and those which are inclusive of it. Only the former can rightly be designated as acts of self-love.
The third appendix explains somewhat further the meaning of the term justice as it was used in the earlier sections of the Enquiry. In these discussions, it was pointed out that justice, like all of the other virtues, is but a means for meeting the needs of people. In an ideal society where all the needs of all the people are supplied in abundance, there is no need for justice and therefore none would exist. This seems simple enough for anyone to understand, but when we stop to consider the application of the principles of justice to the particular problems which arise in human society, a number of complications appear.
How, for example, can one say that a criminal is treated justly when he has been deprived of his property, his liberty, and perhaps even his life? Can we say that his needs have been met by this type of treatment? What about the situation that arises in connection with international warfare when innocent people are killed and their property destroyed in order to defeat the enemy? Is it just and right for society to provide for all the needs of people who refuse to put forth any efforts to take care of themselves?
Hume's answer to these questions is that justice is designed to meet not merely the present particular needs of any individual but has to do with the future even more than the present and with society as a whole rather than certain particular units which may be included in it. This means that at times it may be necessary to sacrifice the present needs of individuals under certain circumstances in order to achieve the larger goal that includes the future and well-being of society as a whole.
It should perhaps be pointed out that Hume's empirical method of accounting for the meaning of justice is scarcely adequate to support all that he has maintained concerning it. Experience does indicate very clearly the changing element that is involved in the application of justice to existing circumstances, but it does not point to any permanent or unchanging element in it. The unchanging element is nevertheless just as important as the changing element. The very fact that Hume makes reference to the "principles" of justice is sufficient to show that he recognizes something about the nature of justice that is not fully revealed by use of the empirical method. Again, his insistence that the future needs of society as a whole should be given preference to the present needs of certain individuals is something that remains constant and is not influenced by changing circumstances.
In the fourth appendix, an attempt is made to eliminate some of the confusions which arise from the misuse of words. One of these consists in the identification of virtues with talents. The Greeks, for example, were often prone to identify goodness with intelligence. Plato had taught that ignorance was the chief source of evil. To call one stupid was regarded as a kind of reproach which carried with it a certain moral condemnation. The same idea has been carried over into modern times and has given support to the belief that education will overcome the evils that are present in society.
Hume recognizes the error that is involved in this type of procedure, which has so often been characteristic of rationalistic moral philosophy. He states correctly that goodness is not the same as intelligence. Goodness always involves an act of the will. It is not the particular abilities with which one is endowed that determines his moral quality but rather the use which he makes of whatever talents he may possess.
Another source of confusion has been the identification of what one believes to be right or wrong in the moral sense with the commands of God. This implies an absurd assumption on the part of the person who claims to know with infallible certainty just what the will of God is. It leads to arrogance, intolerance, and even persecution of innocent persons. One should recognize that ideas about right and wrong come first of all from human experience, and it is not until after this has been done that they are said to be commands of God.
