Summary
Much of the disputation that has occurred in philosophical writings has been due either to ambiguity or vagueness in the use of words. Since words derive their meaning from the way in which they are used and different people do not always use words in the same way to express what they mean, it is easy to understand why disputes of this nature should arise. Hume states that he has tried to avoid this difficulty by a sparse use of the terms virtues and vices. He has chosen rather to speak of those actions which are useful and agreeable or their opposites. In spite of this caution on his part, some of his critics have insisted that he used the terms virtues and vices to include talents or capacities and a lack of these, whereas he should have made a clear distinction between virtues and talents or vices and a lack of certain abilities. It is in defense of the way he has used the terms virtues and vices that this appendix was written. He offers the following considerations in support of the terminology he has used.
The boundary lines separating virtues and talents or vices and defects have never been sharply drawn, and there has been a considerable amount of overlapping in the way these terms have been used. Actions have been classified as voluntary and involuntary, but this does not distinguish between particular talents and the use which is made of them. Aristotle classified virtues as moral and intellectual, the former having to do with actions which are a means to an end and the latter with those activities which are ends in themselves rather than a means for something else. This again is a method of treating capacities and the use made of them as though they belonged together and could not be separated. The same may be said with reference to a division of activities on the basis of being directed by the head or the heart. It is quite possible for us to think of the intellect and the will as though they were separate faculties, but in our actual experience they are usually if not always combined.
One reason why the language used in this connection is not precise is the fact that there is little if any distinction made in the estimation which we place on a person's abilities and the moral quality of the actions which he performs. To call a man stupid is to censure him as much as it is to call him lazy or shiftless. In general, society does not look with approval on either the knave or the coward. We admire both intelligence and generosity, and the one about as much as the other. Consequently, we adjust our estimation of a person if he excels in one but is lacking in the other. One who has a good head but a cold and indifferent heart is rated about the same as one who has a poor head but a warm and generous heart.
The ancient moralists whom we have come to admire a great deal made little or no distinction between virtues and mental endowments. Plato, for example, suggests very strongly that wisdom and goodness belong together. Wrong decisions are in his judgment the result of ignorance, and, for this reason, the development of the mind will lead to the formation of a good character. Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean emphasizes the importance of intelligence for determining the course of conduct which is midway between the extremes of excess and deficiency. The Stoic conception of the good life was one in which the feelings and appetites were brought under the control of one's rational nature.
Modern philosophy, especially ethics, has been so closely related to theology that this accounts for much of the difference between contemporary views and the ones held by the ancients. The science of theology admits of no terms of composition but uses every branch of knowledge for its own purposes and pays little attention to the phenomena of nature or the proper exercise of one's intellectual capacities. From this point of view, the sole basis of virtue is obedience to divine commands, and hence the matter of voluntary or involuntary conduct is of major importance.
