Summary
The question of whether there are any actions prompted by other than selfish motives has been a controversial issue throughout the history of ethical theory. From the time of the ancient Greek Sophists to the present day, there have been philosophers who have maintained that any action professed to have been done in the name of benevolence is nothing more than hypocrisy; that all so-called friendship is but a blind to conceal one's own selfish interests; and that the claim of being public-spirited is a farce often intended to fool the public, in many instances effectively fooling oneself. All of this implies a conception of human nature with which Hume has no sympathy at all. He believes that those who hold such views are under the influence of either a corrupted heart or superficial reasoning.
Closely allied with this view and in some respects forming a part of it is the assertion that there can be no such thing as a disinterested action. Whenever one performs an act of kindness or generosity toward another person, it is said that he does so for the sake of the satisfaction which he himself will derive from it. This may involve a feeling of moral superiority on his part, the likelihood that he will be praised for the performance of a good deed, or any one of numerous other benefits of a similar nature. That a motivation of this kind is a real possibility Hume does not deny, but, at the same time, he asserts with emphasis that this is not the only possibility open to an individual.
That one may act for the sake of someone else rather than for himself is evidenced by the fact that even those who have advocated theories of this kind do not as a rule behave in a manner which is in harmony with their doctrine. For the most part, they are men of kind disposition and generous impulses. Because of an element which is characteristic of human nature, they have found it impossible to avoid holding in esteem the person whose self-love gives way to a deep concern for the welfare of others, or despising the one whose self-gratification never goes beyond his own individual interests. In other words, the most important objection to the hypothesis that all actions are selfish is that this is contrary to the universal feelings of humanity.
