There were among Hume's contemporaries several noted thinkers who had expressed the view that all human actions are necessarily selfish and any pretense of altruism could be nothing more than a disguise for one's own selfishness. Hume was convinced that this position was an untenable one, and it certainly did not represent his view of morality. That it is perfectly natural for one to approve of actions favorable to his own interests and to disapprove of those which are contrary to it was too obvious to be denied. What Hume did deny was that it is impossible for one to be concerned about another person's welfare when this would contribute nothing to his own interests and might even be contrary to it. Human nature as he understood it was so constituted that no normal person can fail to approve of those actions which promote the well-being of individuals — even though it may be that of one's enemies.
On the other hand, one cannot help but disapprove of acts of cruelty and wanton destruction regardless of who it is that may be the victims of such actions. This concern which one person feels toward all other human beings is what he meant by the sense of humanity and the feeling of sympathy which is characteristic of the entire human species. It is the presence of this element in human nature which prevents morality from becoming a purely selfish affair. It accounts for the fact that those actions which are generally considered as most praiseworthy are the ones in which persons voluntarily give up their own private interests in order to promote the welfare of others.
Although Hume's position with reference to morality has often been characterized as an ethics of sentiment rather than of reason, it should be noted that in no instance does he disparage reason or insist that one ought to act contrary to it. Where he differs from his rationalistic predecessors is on the point of the origin of moral principles and the subjective character of their existence. Hume makes it clear in his presentation that reason alone cannot tell anyone what it is that he ought to do. Reason does have a very important function to perform in human life, but it has to do with consistency and with matters of fact. Apart from one's feelings, there can be no sense of obligation or what Immanuel Kant referred to as "oughtness." It is true that one s feelings may be influenced by what he believes to be the facts in the case, and it is in this connection that reason does have something to do with morality, but even in this respect it is the feeling rather than the factual data that is the essential element in any moral judgment.
